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Weintraub: Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law?

WHO'S AFRAID OF CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW?@
Russell J. Weintraub*
I.

SCOPE

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague1 confirms the view that the due
process 2 and full faith and credit 3 clauses impose few limitations on
choice of law, and that a conflicts decision can be undesirable and
unwise without violating constitutional standards.4 This discussion of
Hague first focuses on an object not clearly discernible in the opinions of the Minnesota State District Court, 5 the Supreme Court of
Minnesota,' or the United States Supreme Court.7 This dim object is
the actual state-law issues involved in Hague.
The insurance issues in Hague reveal that no constitutional decision was necessary, and that Wisconsin would have reached the
same result as Minnesota for reasons not discussed in any of the
opinions. Perhaps more important for present purposes, a fuller understanding of the state-law issues' in Hague will illuminate the constitutional-law discussion that follows. In that discussion, I suggest
that if a constitutional decision were necessary, Hague probably
o Copyright 1981, Russell J. Weintraub.
* Bryant Smith Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. B.A. New York

University, 1950; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1953.
1. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).

2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
3. Id. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescibe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof."
4. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9.2A, at 50506, § 9.3A, at 527-31 (2d ed. 1980).
5. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague (Dist. Ct. Minn. Apr. 22, 1977), reprintedin Petition for

Writ of Certiorari at A-25, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
6.
7.
8.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979).
449 U.S. 302 (1981).
See text accompanying notes 12-42 infra.
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reached the right result. 9 Then I discuss the contribution Hague
makes to an understanding of the relationship between constitutional
limitations on choice of law and constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction. 10 Finally, I discuss Hague's implications for
choice-of-law methodology."'
II.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE Co. v. HAGUE: A FALSE CONFLICT

The place to begin discussion of the state law issues in Hague is
the "other insurance" clauses in the uninsured motorist section of
the policy that Allstate issued to Mr. Hague. 2 These clauses read as
follows:
7. Other Insurance. With respect to bodily injury to an insured
while occupying an automobile not owned by the named insured,
the insurance under this coverage shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and
applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of

liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of
such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has
other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the

applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and Allstate shall not be liable for a greater proportion of
any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of liability

hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable
limits of liability of
13
this insurance and such other insurance.
Two distinct problems arise concerning these standard clauses.
The first is a problem of statutory construction. The second concerns
construing the clauses themselves when their meaning is ambiguous.
The problem of statutory construction concerns the validity of
"other insurance" clauses. There are situations in which the meaning
of the clauses is certain and, if the clauses are valid, recovery under
the insured's policy is eliminated or reduced. The first paragraph of
9. See text accompanying notes 43-83 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 84-94 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
12. 1 am grateful to Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, New York University School of Law,

for providing me with a copy of the policy. Professor Lowenfeld argued for the insured before
the United States Supreme Court and was "of counsel" on the brief.
13. Policy issued by Allstate Insurance Co. at 6 [hereinafter cited as Policy] (cogy on
file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
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clause seven is thus clearly applicable when all of the following concur: (1) the insured is injured by an uninsured motorist; (2) the insured is occupying an automobile owned by someone other than the
insured; (3) the owner of the car has uninsured motorist insurance
that covers the insured; and (4) the insured has uninsured motorist
insurance that also covers him in these circumstances.1 4 The second
paragraph of clause seven clearly applies, and therefore coverage is
limited, when all of the following concur: (1) the insured is injured
while a pedestrian; (2) there are two insurance policies covering two
automobiles, issued by two insurance companies; and (3) both policies provide compensation to the insured under these circumstances:
for example, the insured owns an automobile, his father owns another, and the insured is covered by the uninsured motorist provi15
sions of his policy and of his father's policy.
When, in circumstances like these, it is clear that the clauses
apply to reduce coverage, the insured can "stack"1 " uninsured motorist compensation only if the clauses are invalid under applicable
state law. Here is where the problem of statutory construction enters. Many states have statutes requiring every policy to provide uninsured motorist protection that is not less than a sum stated in the
statute. These statutes are ambiguous concerning their effect on
"other insurance" clauses; the question is, do they invalidate such
clauses and require every policy to provide coverage up to the statutory amount even though that coverage is also available under another policy, or do the statutes permit "other insurance" clauses to
operate provided that the insured's total recovery from all policies is
not less than the amount the statute requires for one policy? There is
a split of authority on this issue. Most states have construed their
statutes to invalidate "other insurance" clauses; but some have not.1
Most states, then, require "stacking." The states taking the minority
position do not "forbid" stacking; they simply permit the insurance
company to contract out of stacking by reasonably clear and explicit
provisions in the insurance policy.
This distinction was misunderstood at every level of decision in
14. See Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974).
15. See Horr v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 379 Mich. 562, 153 N.W.2d 655 (1967).

16.

"Stacking" permits recovery up to the policy limits under each applicable policy. If,

as in Hague, there are three policies, each providing $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage, the

insured can recover $15,000 under each policy for a total of $45,000. See 449 U.S. at 305.
17. For a list of states in each category, see Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis.
2d at 565 n.2 (majority), 567 n.3 (minority), 217 N.W.2d at 673 nn.2 (majority) & 3

(minority).
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Hague. There are repeated statements that Minnesota allows stack-

ing and that Wisconsin forbids stacking.18 In fact, however, Minnesota follows the majority of courts in interpreting its minimum coverage statute to require stacking,1 9 and Wisconsin construed an
earlier version of its minimum-coverage statute to permit the parties
to contract for or against stacking. 20 This was the aspect of Wisconsin law in doubt at the time of the accident in Hague. The earlier
version of the Wisconsin statute had been amended before the accident,21 and the resulting provision had yet to be construed in Wisconsin. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in deciding Hague, refused
to find that the rather inconclusive wording changes would be con22
strued by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to change Wisconsin law.
Therefore, in this respect, there was a difference between Minnesota
and Wisconsin law and not the "false conflict" that would have resulted if both states invalidated "other insurance" clauses. This was
the "false conflict" which was urged by the insured 23 upon the
United States Supreme Court as a means of blunting the constitutional issue, and which was rejected by the Court.
There was, however, another kind of "false conflict" present in
Hague. Minnesota and Wisconsin would have reached the same result, stacking, but for different reasons. Under Minnesota law, the
"other insurance" clauses, even if applicable, were invalid. But on
the facts of Hague, the clauses were ambiguous. Mr. Hague's policy
insured three automobiles, each with uninsured motorist coverage for
18. See, e.g., 449 U.S. at 316 n.22 ("allow stacking," "prohibit stacking"); id. at 306
("disallow stacking"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague (Dist. Ct. Minn. Apr. 22, 1977), reprintedin
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A-27, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)
("Wisconsin does not permit stacking"). The Supreme Court of Minnesota came close to getting it right: "Thus, we find that Wisconsin law, in effect at the time of the writing of the
policy, allowed 'excess insurance' clauses and that stacking would not be permitted if Wisconsin law were to apply." 289 N.W.2d at 48. The difficulty with this is that stacking would be
permitted if the "other insurance" clauses did not apply and, in Hague, they did not.
19. See Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973).
Ironically, this case was one in which the applicability of the "other insurance" clauses was
ambiguous, but the court did not have to construe the clauses once it decided that, even if
applicable, they were invalid.
20. See Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974).
21. Id. at 562 n.1, 217 N.W.2d at 672 n.l. The effective date of the amendment was
July 22, 1973. The accident in Hague occurred on July 1, 1974. 289 N.W.2d at 44.
After the accident, the Wisconsin statute was again amended so that it unambiguously
invalidated "other insurance" clauses. See Landvatter v. Globe Security Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 2d
21, 300 N.W.2d 875 (1980).
22. 289 N.W.2d at 48.
23. Brief for the Respondent at 3-5, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
24. 449 U.S. at 306 n.6.
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which he had paid three premiums. 25 It is not clear whether "other
insurance" in the two paragraphs of clause seven of the polsimilar
icy26 referred to insurance issued by the same insurer to the same
insured for an additional premium. The words "Allstate shall not be
liable" in the proration clause of the second paragraph suggest that
the reference was to insurance issued by another company. Furthermore, in the same policy Allstate demonstrated that it could make
its meaning clear on this point. In the section on "Medical Expense," 27 the clause limiting the amount of Allstate's liability began
...28 More"[r]egardless of the number of automobiles insured.
29
over, Allstate admitted that the clauses were ambiguous. Once this
admission was made, it is surprising that the false conflict did not
become apparent. Only some guy who doesn't like mom or apple pie
would construe an ambiguous policy provision in favor of the insurance company.
Five courts have decided on the application of "other insurance"
clauses identical with those in Hague in situations similar to Hague:
multiple uninsured motorist coverage of the same insured by the
same insurer. Four of these cases construed the "other insurance"
clauses as inapplicable and recoveries were stacked. Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Robey3° is closest to the Hague facts. In
25. Id. at 305 n.3.
26. For the complete text of clause seven, see text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
27. Policy, supra note 13, at 9-10.
28. Id. at 10. This indicates that without this specific provision, the "other insurance"
'clause under "Medical Expense" would be ambiguous. The Medical Expense "other insurance" clause reads: "The insurance with respect to a . . . non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other collectible automobile medical payments insurance and, with
respect to . . . an additional automobile, shall not apply against a loss with respect to which
the insured has other collectible automobile medical payments insurance." Id.
A clause under "General Conditions" does not resolve the ambiguity in Hague. "When
two or more automobiles are insured by this policy, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each." Id. at 11.
29. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302 (1981): "Question: It's a question of whether the policy should be construed as limited to
the vehicle described in that policy or without saying anything pick up other vehicles and
additional coverage, then? Mr. Nolan (attorney for Allstate): That's right." The central question before the United States Supreme Court seems to have been concerned with Minnesota's
interpretation of a contract. See Petitioner's Brief at 3; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3,
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
I am grateful to the editors of the Hofstra Law Review for obtaining for me a transcript
of the oral argument and copies of the petition for certiorari and briefs.
30. 399 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1968). In Taft v. Cerwonka, 433 A.2d 215 (R.I. 1981), the
insureds' child was killed in a one-car crash. The car was driven and owned by uninsured
defendants. The insureds were permitted to stack the uninsured motorist coverages under their
policy. The policy insured two automobiles and provided for two uninsured motorist premiums.
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Safeco the insured was a passenger in an automobile owned by another when he was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist.
The insured owned two automobiles, insured each with the same insurer, and paid an uninsured motorist premium on each policy. He
was permitted to stack his uninsured motorist coverage, deducting
only the amount paid to him by another company that covered the
automobile in which he had been riding.
Three cases construing "other insurance" clauses concerned insured pedestrians struck by uninsured motorists.31 Each opinion
found the second paragraph of the "other insurance" provision to be
ambiguous and construed it as inapplicable to multiple coverage by
the same insurer. One of these cases, Glidden v. Farmers Auto
Insurance Association,3 2 has language broad enough to cover both
paragraphs of the "other insurance" clause involved in Hague:
When an insured purchases three distinct policies from an insurer,
each providing the specified coverage, and pays a separate premium for each, does he reasonably contemplate that the 'other insurance' clauses therein are effective to reduce his recovery to what
he would have obtained under one policy? We think not.38
A decision from a Delaware trial court reached an opposite result in an insured pedestrian case and did so by miraculously finding
the second paragraph of the "other insurance" clause clearly applicable, stating that if the clause were ambiguous it would be construed against the insurer.:a In Hague, it should be remembered,
Allstate conceded that the clause was ambiguous.3 5
Wisconsin, of course, construes ambiguities in insurance policies
against the insurer.3 8 Rosar v. General Insurance Co. of America3 is

further evidence that Wisconsin would have reached the same result
as Minnesota in Hague. The Rosar court refused to allow the claimant to stack the insured's liability coverage, but distinguished cases
It is not clear whether the court is construing the Rhode Island statute requiring uninsured
motorist coverage unless rejected by the insured (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1 (1979)), or is
construing the policy, or both. Both grounds are stated in the decision. 433 A.2d at 218.
31. Woolston v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 306 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Glidden
v. Farmers Auto Ins. Ass'n, 57 Il. 2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247 (1974); United Services Auto
Ass'n v. Dokter, 86 Nev. 917, 478 P.2d 583 (1970).
32. 57 11. 2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247 (1974).
33. Id. at 336, 312 N.E.2d at 250.
34. Sammons v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 608 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970).
35. See authority cited note 29 supra.
36. E.g., Ehlers v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 81 Wis. 2d 64, 259 N.W.2d 718 (1977).
37. 41 Wis. 2d 95, 163 N.W.2d 129 (1968).
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from other states that had allowed stacking of medical payments,
stating that "[t]he payment cases can be distinguished because of
the broad protection afforded the named insured and each relative
from bodily injury caused by an accident 'through being struck by
an automobile.' "38 The court further noted that "[m]edical payment
provisions are closely akin to a personal accident policy; recovery is
completely independent of liability on the part of the insured. ' 3 The
same language and reasoning could be applied to uninsured motorist
coverage such as that in Hague.
Some policies make clear the result intended when there is multiple uninsured motorist coverage by the same insurer. These policies
specifically include in the "other insurance" clause "any other automobile insurance policy issued to the named insured by the company." In states where "other insurance" clauses are valid, these unambiguous clauses are enforced to prevent stacking.40
The Minnesota Supreme Court could have avoided the need to
choose between Minnesota and Wisconsin law by writing the following opinion: "This is a 'false conflict' because the same result would
be reached in each state. If Minnesota law applies, coverage is
stacked because the 'other insurance' clause, even if applicable, is
invalid. If Wisconsin law applies, coverage is stacked because the
clause does not clearly apply to multiple coverages of the same insured by the same insurer, and this ambiguity will be resolved
against the insurer." But if this were done, there would have been no
need for the Supreme Court of the United States to decide Hague,
and, alas, no occasion for this symposium.
Hague was not the first case in which the Court needlessly
shaped constitutional limitations on choice of law. 4 ' Let us, there38.

Id. at 101-02, 163 N.W.2d at 132.

39. Id., 163 N.W.2d at 132 (quoting Government Employee's Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186
So.2d 95, 96-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).

40. See, e.g., M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968);
Menke v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 78 I11.2d 420, 401 N.E.2d 539 (1980); cf. State Farm Mut.

Auto Ins. Co. v. Scitzs, 394 So.2d 1371 (Miss. 1981) (stacking of medical payments is not
permitted when each of three policies limited coverage to injury while occupying the one auto-

mobile described in that policy).
41.

In Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955), the majority rejected Justice Frank-

furter's suggestion that the case be remanded for determination as to whether tort recovery
against the general contractor could have been obtained under Missouri law as well as under
Arkansas law. Id. at 422-26. In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), the policy

could be cancelled by the company on five days' notice. Record at 3c. The company was informed that Clay had moved to Florida, 377 U.S at 182, and it did not cancel. There was,

therefore, no more constitutional objection to applying Florida law to invalidate a term of the
policy than if the policy had originally been issued in Florida.
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fore, seize this occasion to talk of such limitations and, to borrow
that magnificent phrase from Coleridge, invoke a "willing suspension
of disbelief."' 42 Pretend that Hague was necessary.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW

A.

Bad But Constitutional Result

I believe that Hague reached the right result on the constitutional issue 43 even though I also agree with Justice Stevens that the
Minnesota Supreme Court decision was "plainly unsound as a matter of normal conflicts law."' 44 Minnesota did not, as the insurer argued on appeal, apply its law to "interpret"' 45 an ambiguous clause in
the policy. Rather, the Minnesota insurance statute was applied to
invalidate a clause valid in Wisconsin. Minnesota did this even
though, as indicated in the constitutional law discussion to follow,
there was no contact with Minnesota, save the widow's subsequent
move to Minnesota, that gave Minnesota an "interest" in having its
law applied. Minnesota had an "interest" in this context only if, because of some connection with the parties or the events, Minnesota
was likely to experience the social consequences of validating the
"other insurance" clause. Minnesota should have desisted from asserting an interest derived solely from the widow's post-accident
move because use of this contact appears unfair to the insurer even
though the insurer would not, and probably could not, have altered
its conduct in any way if it had foreseen what Minnesota would do.
Minnesota also should have applied Wisconsin law because the
validity of the contract between insured and insurer would be best
determined by the law of the state where the car was principally
garaged and registered and where the insured resided. The Minnesota legislature seems to have recognized this; the statute requiring
uninsured motorist coverage, which the Minnesota Supreme Court
had interpreted to invalidate "other insurance" clauses,'46 reads:
"[n]o.

.

. policy.

. .

shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this

state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
42. 2 S. COLERIDGE, BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA 6 (J. Shawcross ed. 1907).
43. For a contrary view expressed before the United States Supreme Court's decision,
see Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 872, 883 (1980).
44. 449 U.S. at 324 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
45. Petitioner's Brief at 3; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
46. Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973).
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garaged in this state unless [uninsured motorist] coverage is provided . . .-.
B.

No Full Faith and Credit Violation

The full faith and credit clause should not prevent application
of the law of one state unless there are cogent reasons for mandating
a uniform national result under the public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of another state. 48 Rarely if ever will this standard require choice of one state's law to apply to a controversy not yet
reduced to judgment. 49 This is not, as Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion suggests, 50 because full faith and credit and due process
choice-of-law standards are similar. They are not. 51 It is because
there is not likely to be a compelling need for a uniform national
choice-of-law result.52
Hague does not furnish an appropriate setting for the rare
emergence53 of full faith and credit as a limitation on choice of law.
An argument can be made that the validity of automobile insurance
agreements as between insurer and insured should always be determined by the law of the state where the car is principally garaged
and where the insured resides. This argument is as strong as that
added). See
was renumbered as 65B.22); id. § 65B.22 (West Supp. 1981) (indicating that this section was in effect
until January 1, 1975); cf Ewers v. Thunderbird Aviation, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Minn.
1979) (words "within the airspace above this state" in airplane owners' liability statute mean
at any time during flight even though crash is in another state). In this case all parties were
Minnesota residents and, at least without a statutory provision determining territorial applicability, the result makes eminent conflicts sense.
48. See 449 U.S. at 323 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); R. WEINTRAUB,
supra note 4, § 9.3A, at 528.
49. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (California need not give full faith
and credit to Nevada's limited waiver of sovereign immunity).
Perhaps there are circumstances in which a state's interest in applying its own law is
greater than even the national need for full faith and credit to sister-state judgments. On two
occasions, Justice Frankfurter said this was so in child custody adjudications. See Kovacs v.
Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 611-12 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); cf. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448
U.S. 261, 268 (1980) (Stevens, J., stating in plurality opinion that full faith and credit need
not be given to workers' compensation award that expressly seeks to prevent supplemental
award under law of another state).
50. 449 U.S. at 308 n.10 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
51. See id. at 321-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
52. But see Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S.
CAL. L. REv. 61, 73 (1978) (full faith and credit to internal law and conflicts law of most
interested state).
53. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 4, § 9.3A.
47. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.22(I) (West 1968) (repealed 1975) (emphasis
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.149 (West Supp. 1981) (indicating that this section
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which has led the United States Supreme Court, in Order of United
Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe," to require that the
validity of fraternal beneficiary insurance contracts be determined by
the law of place of incorporation of the fraternal society.55 But this
and similar decisions 56 were ill-advised. They gave too little effect to
the policies of the state where the insured resided and made too
much of the supposed distinction between fraternal beneficiary insurance and other life insurance. They are ripe for overruling should the
occasion arise 57 and their invocation of the full faith and credit
clause should not be followed for automobile insurance. 58 Due process is a better tool than full faith and credit for measuring the reasonableness of choice of law against the facts of a particular case.
C. No Due Process Violation
The constitutional choice-of-law standard set forth in Hague
says "that for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,
such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair."59 In general, I agree with this standard and with the majority's conclusion that it was met.
Minnesota law was applied in Hague to invalidate a clause affecting the rights of the insured against the insurer. If such a clause
is valid under the law of the state where the car is principally ga54. 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
55. Id. at 589.
56.

See Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938)

(validity of bylaw excusing assessments after 20 years must be determined under law of state
where society is incorporated); Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925)
(same holding for validity of retroactive bylaw withholding benefits); Supreme Counsel of the

Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915) (same holding for validity of bylaws under
which assessments were increased).
57. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (latest in series, a 5-4 opinion).
58.

Several court decisions suggest that the rule of Order of United Commercial Trav-

elers should be limited to circumstances which are factually alike. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964) (Court did not apply rule of Order of United Commer-

cial Travelers because "it is a highly specialized decision dealing with unique facts ... ");
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 558 n.12 (2d Cir. 1962) (court questioned
validity of Order of United Commercial Travelers on interest analysis basis and further stated

that opinion of case implies that it be limited to circumstances factually alike); United States
v. Jacobs, 155 F. Supp. 182, 197 (D.N.J. 1957) (court determined that Order of United Commercial Travelers "must be viewed . . . as not extending beyond the confines of a very
restricted field ... ").

59. 449 U.S. at 312-13.
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raged and the insured resides, however, its validity should not be
changed because of an injury incurred in another state.60 It is true
that Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 1 for example,
permitted invalidation of a no-direct-action clause under the law of
Louisiana where a product user was injured, but Watson was significantly different on this point. The plaintiff in Watson was not the
insured, and had not promised to refrain from direct action.62
Nevertheless, Allstate cannot claim unfair surprise for two reasons. First, the clause invalidated was ambiguous. It did not state
clearly that coverage provided by the same insurer to the same insured for additional premiums could not be stacked. The more ambiguous the clause, the less justifiable is reliance on it.63 Second, the
contract was one of insurance. Insurance rates are based on the loss
experience of automobiles ,principally garaged in a particular rating
district. If, because of Hague, the loss experience of automobiles
principally garaged in rating districts in Wisconsin near the Minnesota border rises, the insurance rates for these cars will increase.
Moreover, the "loss" experience used in setting rates includes "loss
reserves." The loss reserve for a particular accident is the estimated
payment. This estimate is reviewed and adjusted from time to time
until final payment of the claim." To talk of surprising an insurer by
applying a rule of law that makes a particular loss greater than it
would have been under a different law is talking nonsense.
60.

Cf. Decker v. Great American Ins. Co., 392 So.2d 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

(dictum that forum law would not be applied to determine amount of uninsured motorist compensation if there were no other contact with forum except place of accident). But see Hime v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 284 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032

(1980) (Minnesota law applied to invalidate family liability exclusion when accident was in
Minnesota and Florida insured was hospitalized in Minnesota); Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 601
P.2d 20 (Mont. 1979) (law of place of accident, characterized as "place of performance,"
applied to determine amount of uninsured motorist coverage).
61.
62.

348 U.S. 66 (1954).
Id. at 67-69.

63. See 449 U.S. at 324 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting ambiguity of
clause).
The opinion also noted that the policy contained no choice-of-law clause and suggested

that this is a further indication that Allstate was not relying on Wisconsin law. See id. at 318
n.24 (plurality opinion), 329-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). The policy did state:

"Such terms of this policy as are in conflict with statutes of the state in which this policy is
issued are hereby amended to conform." Policy, supra note 13, at 12. This assumes that the

laws of that state would govern validity and, if not an express, is an implied-in-fact choice of
that law.
64. See McNamara, Automobile Liability Insurance Rates, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 398,
401 (1968); Stern, Ratemaking Proceduresfor Automobile Liability Insurance, 52 PRoc.
CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC'Y 139, 144-45 (1965).
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Given that the application of Minnesota law caused no outrageous surprise to Allstate, is any more needed to accord with due
process? Yes. The plurality opinion said that Minnesota "must have
a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests. . ... " There are two quite different ways to evaluate the due process significance of a contact between a state and the
parties or the events. First, it could be required that the contact be
such that the state is likely to experience the social consequences if
its law is not applied. Second, the contact could simply be one that,
viewed without regard to the policies underlying any law of that
state, seems "significant"--a visceral, not analytical, designation. In
the light of the words "creating state interests" in the plurality formulation, the first meaning seems intended. But is it? Does each of
the "contacts" relied on by the plurality make it likely that adverse
social consequences will be experienced in Minnesota if the "other
insurance" clause is not invalidated and recovery raised from
$15,000 to $45,000?
The first contact referred to was that Mr. Hague worked in
Minnesota for fifteen years and commuted to work there. It is said to
be "very important [that] Mr. Hague was a member of Minnesota's
work force.

...06 But why does this give Minnesota an "interest"

in increasing the compensation to his widow? If Mr. Hague were
injured, not killed, perhaps higher compensation would speed his rehabilitation and return to work in Minnesota, thus benefiting the
Minnesota employer and the Minnesota economy. But Mr. Hague
was dead on arrival at the Minnesota hospital to which he was taken
after the accident.67 Yet the Court stated:
Mr. Hague's death affects Minnesota's interest still more acutely,
even though Mr. Hague will not return to the Minnesota work
force. Minnesota's work force is surely affected by the level of protection the State extends to it, either directly or indirectly. Vindication of the rights of the estate of a Minnesota employee, therefore,
is an important state concern. 8
Is this cogent? Perhaps the concept is that higher uninsured motorist
coverage is a fringe benefit of working in Minnesota-like Minne65. 449 U.S. at 313.
66.

Id.

67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)
(statement by Mr. Lowenfeld).
68. 449 U.S. at 315.
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sota-regulated employee pensions or life insurance.69 The better the
benefits, the happier and more productive Minnesota workers are
likely to be. Yet I doubt that application of the Minnesota uninsured-motorist-coverage stacking rule for beneficiaries of a deceased
employee could have been considered by or have influenced the performance of an employee.
It is interesting that the Minnesota Supreme Court made almost no mention of the fact that Mr. Hague worked in Minnesota.70
When the Minnesota court explained its "governmental interest" in
applying its law it spoke only about its concern for "fully compensating resident accident victims and thus keeping them off welfare rolls
and enabling them to meet financial obligations." ' Earlier in the
opinion, when the court was deciding whether there are Minnesota
interests that conflict with Wisconsin interests, it mentioned the fact
that the decedent traveled to work in Minnesota, but it did not explain why this triggered a Minnesota "interest." All the court said
was "thus, the risk which was covered by the policy was located in
Minnesota as well as Wisconsin. ' 2 If, as seems likely, the court
meant that the insurer could therefore foresee that the automobile
might be driven into Minnesota, the opinion later indicates that this
was taken care of by the mere fact that an automobile insurance
policy was involved. 3
The second contact mentioned by the plurality was that "All17 4
If
state was at all times present and doing business in Minnesota.
7
5
it is assumed, as it was in Hague, that doing a large volume of
69.

Cf. 81 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1968). The author argued that a state's "statutory

wrongful death action is designed to compensate the plaintiffs for the losses sustained by them

due to the victim's death. It is analogous in this sense to a life insurance policy-a form of
security which the state gives its citizens against wrongful death, ensuring them that their
survivors may be provided for through institution of suit against the tortfeasor." Id. at 1345-46
(footnote omitted).
70. For a discussion of the employment "contact" in Hague, see Brilmayer, Legitimate
Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV.
1315, 1341-47 (1981). I am grateful to Professor Brilmayer for the opportunity to read her

article in manuscript.
71.

289 N.W.2d at 49.

72. Id. at 47; cf. Johnson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 289 So.2d 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (applying Florida law to invalidate restriction on uninsured motorist coverage, partly on

basis of insured's commuting from Alabama to work in Florida).
73.

289 N.W.2d at 50.

74. 449 U.S. at 317 (footnote omitted).
75. See Petitioner's Brief at 6, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981): "There

is no dispute in this case as to jurisdiction." For an examination of this assumption, see text
accompanying notes 88-94 infra.
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business in a state is a constitutional, generally affiliating 8 basis for
personal jurisdiction, Allstate could therefore be sued in Minnesota.
Does this mean that any state in which "Allstate" is doing business
can provide a forum to invalidate a clause in a policy if there is no
other contact with that state? I hope not. Qualifying to do business
in a state permits the state to regulate the business in some ways. 7
But invalidating a policy on a car principally garaged elsewhere is
going too far. In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Yatess an insurer was doing business in Georgia. Georgia, however,
was not permitted to apply its rule on materiality of misrepresentation, even under the guise of a rule of "procedure." Yates was
treated in Hague as still good law.79
The third contact invoked by the plurality was Mrs. Hague's
move to Minnesota after her husband's death. The Court noted that
the motives for this move were not connected with the litigation"0
and that Mrs. Hague's Minnesota residency at the time of decision
gave that state an "interest" in increasing the compensation paid to
her because Minnesota might then experience the social consequences of inadequate compensation to the widow. 8' The due process
question was whether it is fair and reasonable for Minnesota to assert this interest in the light of Minnesota's other contacts with the
76. A contact is "generally affiliating" if it permits exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant in any action, even one not related to the contact. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 656 (1965).
77. In Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), Justice Frankfurter concurred on the ground that the insurer had consented to direct suit in order to get a
certificate to do business in Louisiana. Id. at 74 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
In National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Brahan, 193 U.S. 635, 645 (1904), the Court allowed
forum usury law to be applied partly on the ground that the company qualified to do business
there. In Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), the Court noted that the insurer was
not doing business in Texas and remarked: "We need not consider how far the State may go in
imposing restrictions on the conduct of its own residents, and of foreign corporations which
have received permission to do business within its borders. . . ." Id. at 410. Petty v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 290 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1980), applied Minnesota law to require stacking under two
California policies of a California resident injured in Minnesota while driving his daughter's
automobile. The court stated: "Allstate's obligation to allow stacking of policies in this case
arises from the duties imposed upon it for the privilege of doing business in Minnesota, not its
private contract with the [insured]." Id. at 766.
78. 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
79. See, e.g., 449 U.S. at 312 (citing Yates as one of sources of constitutional standard
articulated). But see Lettieri v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 627 F.2d 930, 931 (9th Cir. 1980)
(reaching opposite result on facts substantially the same as Yates and citing Yates only for
substantive content of New York law).
80. 449 U.S. at 319.
81. Id.
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parties and the transaction. If Yates is still good law, the move itself
would not have been sufficient, unless Yates can be distinguished.
Perhaps in Yates the insurer would have acted sooner to obtain evidence concerning Mr. Yates' conversation with the agent if the insurer could have foreseen that this conversation would be admissible.
But this is highly speculative, and it may be that the evidence could
not have been rebutted in any event: it may have been true.
Whether it was fair and reasonable for Minnesota to assert its
interest in compensating the widow poses a close question. I conclude
that it was not fair and reasonable for sound conflicts analysis but
was sufficiently fair to squeeze past a due process standard. It is unlikely that the other Minnesota contacts (Hague's working-commuting and Allstate's doing business) were sufficient to give Minnesota
an "interest" in applying its law if "interest" means that, because of
the contact, Minnesota is likely to experience a social consequence
its law seeks to avoid. But the existence of these contacts, particularly working-commuting, may keep an assertion of Minnesota's
late-acquired "interest" in the widow from evoking the visceral feelings of outrage that would trigger a due process interdiction.
A contact with Minnesota not mentioned in the opinion was
that Mr. Hague was taken to a Minnesota hospital near the Wisconsin border.8 2 Had he received substantial medical treatment, Minnesota would have had an interest in increasing compensation to make
it more likely that Minnesota medical creditors would be paid. In
fact, however, Mr. Hague was dead on arrival at the hospital83 and
the expense incurred could not have been substantial. But suppose
the medical expense were substantial and Minnesota doctors would
go unpaid if the uninsured motorist recovery were not increased by
$30,000. This should not be enough for application of Minnesota law
to invalidate the term of an insurance policy settling the rights and
duties of the contracting parties and valid in Wisconsin. This medical-compensation interest of the place of injury may justify application of the rules of tort recovery of the place of injury, but not application of its insurance regulations: Justifiable expectations are not
likely to be based on rules concerning unintentional torts.
82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)
(statement by Mr. Lowenfeld).

83. Id.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON CHOICE OF LAW AND ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague and Rush v. Savchuck,81 another recent case from the Minnesota Supreme Court, illustrate the
relationship between constitutional limitations on choice of law and
personal jurisdiction. 5 In Hague, the Minnesota Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction over the insurer on the basis of the insurer's doing business in Minnesota, even though the cause of action did not
arise from Allstate's Minnesota business. The result was a choice-oflaw decision so questionable that three Supreme Court Justices
thought it unconstitutional. In Rush, the Minnesota courts sought to
exercise jurisdiction over an automobile accident case even though
the defendant driver resided in Indiana, where the accident happened. After the accident, the plaintiff moved to Minnesota from Indiana. Jurisdiction was based on garnishment of the Indiana defendant's liability insurance, or more specifically, the insurer's
obligation to defend and indemnify the defendant. If jurisdiction
were exercised, the defendant asserted that Minnesota courts would
then proceed to apply Minnesota law, which differed from Indiana
law on two crucial issues: Minnesota had comparative rather than
contributory negligence and Minnesota had no guest statute. 6 The
Minnesota courts were not given the opportunity to commit this
choice-of-law outrage, however, because their exercise of jurisdiction
was held unconstitutional.
There are two distinct routes that might be taken to prevent
choice-of-law decisions like Hague, which are bad, if not unconstitutional, and which give the new conflicts methodology a reputation for
"forum preference" and "discrimination in favor of forum residents.18 7 One route is closer constitutional supervision of conflicts
84. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
85. See 449 U.S. at 317 n.23. This Court indicated that different answers may be given
to the constitutionality of jurisdiction and choice of law. The Court said, however, that the two
questions "'are often closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar considerations.'" Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 224-25 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958)
(Black, J., dissenting))).
86. 444 U.S. at 325 n.8.
87. See, e.g., Hime v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 284 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980) (court invalidated family immunity clause in Florida automobile policy); Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665
(1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976) (court applied Minnesota comparative negligence
rule to permit recovery by Minnesota plaintiff for Indiana accident).
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decisions. Hague indicates that this route will not be taken. The
other route is to restrict jurisdiction to a state whose contacts with
the parties and with the transaction make it desirable for the law of
that state to be applied.8 8 The most obvious departures from this
route today are the generally affiliating bases for jurisdiction: doing
business (Hague),89 personal presence, and, to a lesser extent,9 0 domicile and incorporation. Shaffer v. Heitner's1 statement that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards [of fair play and substantial justice] set forth in International Shoe and its progeny"9 2 has given rise to hope that transient
presence will no longer suffice as a basis for jurisdiction. 93 But with
this possible exception, it is unlikely that the generally affiliating
bases for jurisdiction will be or should be abolished. Hague itself is a
good example. It was not unreasonable to make Allstate defend in a
state where it was doing a huge volume of business, less than 100
miles from the crash site,9 4 especially in a case in which there were
no significant fact issues. Allstate's legitimate complaint was that it
had Minnesota law imposed on it. This was the complaint rejected in
Hague.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CHOICE-OF-LAW METHODOLOGY

Hague places the imprimatur of the United States Supreme
Court on the new choice-of-law methodology and the abandonment
of territorially oriented rules. The plurality opinion speaks disparagingly of "the wooden lex loci delicti doctrine" 9 5 and cites with apparent approval cases in the vanguard of modern interest-functional
analysis.9 6 The three dissenters would go so far as to raise interest
88. Cf. Martin, supra note 43, at 872-73 (suggesting that if forum has only generally
affiliating jurisdiction, it may not apply its own law).
89. See also Schreiber v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff
found forum in which defendant was doing business and which had long statute of limitations
and no statutory exception to rule that statutes of limitations are "procedural").
90. To a "lesser extent" because the contacts of domicile and incorporation are likely to
make it reasonable to apply the law of that state.
91. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
92. Id. at 212.
93. See Sedler, Judicial Jurisdictionand Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer
v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 1031, 1035 (1978); Vernon, Single-FactorBases of In Personam
Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273,
303 (1978). But see Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980) (approving
jurisdiction over defendant served while bowling in border county).
94. The trial in Hague was in Hennepin County. 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979).
95. 449 U.S. at 316 n.22.
96. Id. at 314 n.19. This note also cites Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.),
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analysis, . la Brainerd Currie, to a constitutional requirement. 7 This
should help still any remaining suggestions here or abroad that the
new methods are a fad and that the hot-blooded revolutionaries will
soon return to their senses and the "certainty" of sticking pins in
maps. Hague also indicates how far we have to travel. We have not
articulated a cogent, coherent, reasonably administrable conflicts
methodology to whose banner all reasonable courts will rally.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If a choice of law does not outrageously surprise one of the parties, it will rarely be held unconstitutional. The state whose law is
applied need have only sufficient nexus with the parties or with the
transaction to keep the choice from appearing patently arbitrary.
Absent the testing of contacts by interest analysis, as advocated by
the Hague dissent, it is not easy to predict when the boundary of
arbitrariness is crossed.
It is probably undesirable to abolish all generally affiliating bases for jurisdiction or to raise interest analysis to a constitutional
requirement. We may wince when some benighted place of injury
applies its law to deny a cause of action between parties who reside
where recovery would be permitted. But opinions like Hague indicate
that much more choice-of-law experimentation is needed. And
Hague does promise that we will protect the party who most needs
protection from choice-of-law madness. He who justifiably plans his
conduct under the law of one state will not have that conduct judged
by the different law of another state if he had no reason to foresee
the application of that law. This is half a loaf, but it will sustain us
in our task of clarifying and improving conflicts analysis.

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973), which applied New York law to increase recovery for the
death of a New Yorker operated on in Massachusetts. Most commentators thought the decision bad, some so bad as to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,78
COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1605 (1978) (arguing that Rosenthal violated due process). The citation of Rosenthal without comment may indicate that the decision did not cross the due process line but, I trust, does not mean that the case reached the proper result.
97. 449 U.S. at 334-35 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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